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CASES NOTED
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT

THE OFFICE oF A'ToRNEY -

REGULATION OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

- United States v. Driscoll, 276 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).Defendant had been convicted for violations of the federal tax law and an investigator, employed by the law firm of which defendant was a member, had
been questioning jurors concerning the reasons for their verdict. On the
basis that such questioning tended to harass the jurors and that it contravened the public policy that jurors must be secure in the belief that their
deliberations will be free from involuntary public disclosure, the federal
district court granted plaintiff's motion to enjoin the questioning.
By so holding, the court clarified the majority position that questioning
of jurors concerning their verdict may be permitted for the purposes of research in trial technique and for determining whether grounds for a new
trial exist where there is reason to suspect that the jury acted improperly
- provided such questioning does not harass the jurors. At the same time,
the opinion providently serves as a medium for reconciling conflicting opinions of the American Bar Association and local bar associations on this
question.
BROKERS
DUTIES AND LuBILITmS TO PINCIPAL -

SKILL AND CARE REQUIRED

-

Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Walston & Co., 21 N.Y.2d 219, 239
NE.2d 230, 287 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1967). - An employee of Bache & Company, plaintiff's assignor, embezzled certain stock certificates after having
them transferred to an apparently fictitious person. An unknown party,
claiming to be the fictitious person, employed defendant, a stockbroker, to
sell the certificates. After the defendant sold the certificates, which it did
after minimal examination of the unknown party's identity, the plaintiff
brought an action claiming that defendant failed to act in a commercially
reasonable manner to discover the seller's identity and was therefore liable
for the loss. The New York Court of Appeals accepted plaintiff's view,
holding that the law in effect at the time of the transaction represented a
policy that owners of stolen shares were to be protected by holding selling
brokers to a high duty to verify the identity of the share sellers.
The dissenting opinion, noting that the Uniform Commercial Code became effective I month after the illegal transaction, argued that the policy
of section 3-405 would place the burden of the loss on the employer, Bache,
as a risk of doing business, and that the policy should be implemented in
this case even though the Code was not in effect at the time of the trans-

action.
COMMERCIAL LAW
AGENT'S PERSONAL LIABILITY - Pollin V.
Mindy Manufacturing Co., 4 U.C.C. Reporting Serv. 827 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1967). - Defendant, president of a small manufacturing company, signed
his own name to the corporation's payroll checks without indicating his office or representative capacity. The payee-employees endorsed the checks
to plaintiff, and when the drawee bank refused payment because of insuf-

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
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ficient funds, plaintiff brought suit on the checks against the corporation
and its president. Judgment by default was entered against the corporation
and summary judgment was entered against the individual defendant on the
authority of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-403 (2) which provides that
"[a]n authorized representative who signs his [own] name to an instrument
*.
(b) .. . is personally obligated if the instrument names the person

represented but does not show that the representative signed in his representative capacity .... "
On appeal the decision against the individual defendant was reversed by
a Pennsylvania Superior Court. The court held that the checks, viewed in
their entirety, sufficiently disclosed that the signature was in a representa-

tive capacity where the name and address of the corporation were imprinted
at the top of each check, the checks indicated that they were payable from a

special corporate account, and the name of the corporation was imprinted
above two lines in the lower right hand comer clearly intended for the signatures of corporate officers. The decision appears to be the first under the
Code holding that consideration may be given to the entire instrument
where the drawer's agent failed to expressly indicate that he signed as a

representative.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS - DEFENSES - Brotherton v. McYaters, 438
P.2d 1 (Okla. 1968).- Defendant endorsed a check, of which he was the
payee, to the plaintiff in partial payment for certain repairs made upon his
truck. The drawer stopped payment and the defendant refused to pay the
amount of the check. At trial the defendant raised the defense of failure
of consideration on the grounds that the truck had not been properly repaired. This issue was found in the defendant's favor and judgement was
entered accordingly. Affirming the decision of the trial court, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not a holder in due course, and
as such was subject to this defense by an endorser.
This reconciliation of section 3-414 (contract of the endorser) and section 3-408 (consideration) of the Uniform Commercial Code is consonant
with the law as it existed under section 28 of the old Negotiable Instruments Law and, as such, is supported by decisions arising under the prior
law.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CLASS LEGISLATION - DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PARTICULAR CLASSES
OF PERSONS - Ramos v. Health & Social Services Board, 276 F. Supp. 474
(E.D. Wis. 1967). - A mother and her five children moved back to the
mother's family home in Wisconsin after being deserted by the father. With
no job and no one to support the family, the mother applied for benefits
under the aid to dependent children program. This aid was denied her by
welfare authorities because she did not meet the statutory requirement of
1 year's residency within the State for the year immediately preceding application for aid. The mother brought an action to enjoin enforcement of
the residence requirement on the theory that it denied her equal protection
of the laws. Adopting the plaintiff's argument, a federal district court held
that even if there were a legitimate legislative purpose for the statute, the

statute nevertheless was too broad in that it excluded certain classes of persons without a valid reason.
The court noted a recent trend of federal district courts to enjoin en-
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forcement of such legislative requirements because of their apparent failure
to provide equal protection of the laws.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDiNGS - United States
v. Freeman,388 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1967).- Upon initially being classified
I-A for the draft, defendant failed to exercise his right to a personal appearance and appeal. When ordered to report for a physical examination 1 year
later, defendant requested conscientious objector status but his local board
refused to reopen his classification. Defendant ultimately refused to submit
to induction and was sentenced to prison.
In reversing defendant's sentence, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit pointed out that if a registrants request to have his classification reopened is denied, the Selective Service regulations do not afford him the
right to an administrative appeal. The court therefore reasoned that the
local board must not be arbitrary in its refusal to reopen a person's classification. The court held that in the defendant's case the refusal was arbitrary
and thereby a denial of due process. In reaching this conclusion the court
took a position consonant with that taken by the Fifth Circuit in Olvera v.
United States, 223 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1955).
DuE PROCESS OF LAW -

PERSONAL, CIVIL, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS -

DEFINITION OF OFFENSE -

Cleveland v. Andersons, 13 Ohio App. 2d 83, 234 N.E.2d 304 (1968). - In
appealing a conviction for participating in a disorderly assembly, appellant
challenged the constitutionality of CLEVELAND PENA. CODE § 13.1124.
This section provides that it is a crime for any person to "knowingly and
willfully constitute or make himself a part of any noisy, boisterous or disorderly assemblage of persons, countenancing the same by his presence,
which annoys the inhabitants of the city .... " The appellate court, in reversing the conviction, held that the ordinance violated appellants rights
to due process of law and freedom of assembly guaranteed by the United
States and Ohio Constitutions.
As to the first defect, the court reasoned that the language of the ordinance was too vague to provide an ascertainable standard of behavior to
govern its enforcement. As to the second, the court held that the city abused
its police power by making mere presence at a noisy assemblage a crime.
In reaching its conclusion, the court has required the city of Cleveland to
bring its ordinance into conformity with the unlawful assembly legislation
of most other jurisdictions. This latter legislation requires that the intent
to achieve a purpose which will interfere with the rights of others be proven
to sustain a conviction.
CONTRACTS
PARTNERSHIP - PROVISIONS DELINEATING INTERESTS OF PARTIES UPON
Blount V. Smith, 12 Ohio St. 2d 41, 231
THE WITHDRAWAL OF ONE -

N.E.2d 301 (1967). - The plaintiff and defendants entered into a medical partnership agreement. The provision for withdrawal provided that any
withdrawal for reason other than death or total disability must be preceded
by 6 months notice. In the absence of this notice, the withdrawing partner
was to lose all his accounts receivable and his capital investment. Plaintiff
gave notice of only 1 month and demanded his accounts receivable and
capital investment contending that the provision calling for their forfeiture
was unenforceable because it was a penalty. The Ohio Supreme Court,
however, held that the withdrawal clause was valid because there was noth-
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ing in the record to indicate that the forfeiture of the accounts receivable
and the capital investment did not bear a relationship to the loss which
would reasonably be sustained by the partnership.
The decision reiterates the familiar judicial doctrine of contract law
that liquidated damages in a contract will not be deemed a penalty when
the court is unable to determine the amount of damages sustained by a
breach. The court assumed the parties to have taken the uncertain and
speculative character of the damages into consideration.
COUNTIES
LIABILITmES FOR TORTS -

INJURmS BY MOBS OR OTHER WRONGDOERS

-

Kelly v'. Beckman, 13 Ohio Misc. 219, 234 N.E.2d 624 (Cinc. Mun. Ct.
1967). - During the riots which rocked Cincinnati, Ohio during June 1967,
plaintiff, a taxicab driver, was pulled from his vehicle by an angry mob and
severely beaten. Plaintiff brought an action for damages under OHIO REv.
CODE § 3761.03 which provides that a person "assaulted and lynched by a
mob may recover from the county in which such assault is made."
By sustaining the county's demurrer to the petition, the Cincinnati Municipal Court adhered to the State doctrine which imposes a strict construction on the 70-year-old statute. Plaintiff failed in his attempt to meet
the burden of establishing the second statutory requirement of being
"lynched." That term, it was held, encompasses the concept of an unruly
mob of private individuals violently and unlawfully attempting to exercise
correctional powers over a real or supposed wrongdoer to punish him for his
actions. Significantly, however, the court conceded that the statute was
archaic and should be repealed because it exonerates county governments
from their protective responsibilities. A doubt was also expressed by the
court as to the law's constitutionality inasmuch as it limits the class of people who may recover.
CRimiNAL LAw
WAIVER United States v. Rivera, 388 F.2d
745 (2d Cir. 1968). - Acting through an informant, federal narcotics
agents apprehended defendant in the eastern district of New York and
seized nine packages of cocaine from his automobile, none of which bore the
required federal tax stamps. Defendant was indicted in the eastern district
for illegal purchase of narcotics under 26 U.S.C. S 4707 (a) (1964) which
provides that mere possession of narcotics without the appropriate tax
stamps is prima facie evidence of illegal purchase. At the close of the government's evidence, defendant's motion for acquittal on three specified
grounds - none of which included any express objection to venue - was
denied and he was found guilty of illegal purchase.
On appeal, defendant objected to venue contending that although proof
of mere possession of narcotics in the eastern district might create a presumption of an illegal purchase, such proof could not, consistant with the
Constitution, create a presumption of purchase in the eastern district where
the government's own testimony tended to show a prior possession in the
southern district. Defendant's conviction, however, was affirmed by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The court held that although an objection
to venue is preserved by a general motion for acquittal, nevertheless, where
counsel moves for acquittal on specific grounds without any mention of
venue, objection to venue is waived and cannot be raised on appeal. The
OBJECTION TO VENUE -
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decision is in accord with Gilbert v. United States, 359 F.2d 285 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 882 (1966), which held that a waiver is presumed
where the movant fails to mention venue among his specific grounds in support of a motion for acquittal
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO DESCENT OR DISTRIBuTON - BANK ACCOUNT
PAYA13LE ON DEATH TO NAMED BENEFICIARY - In re Estate of TonsiC,

13 Ohio App. 2d 195, 235 N.E.2d 239 (1968). - Mr. Tonsic had entered
into a contract with his bank whereby he created three savings accounts
made payable to his children on his death. OHIO REV. CODE § 2131.10
grants the right to an Ohio citizen to create such accounts notwithstanding
any requirements of the statute of wills. The probate court held that section 2131.10 was ineffectual and that the savings accounts were therefore
part of Tonsic's estate. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the
statute was dear and the decedent having met the requirements was entitled to have the accounts pass to the named beneficiaries.
The court of appeals, in sustaining the statute, recognized that it was
supporting a minority position. Previous to the passage of section 2131.10
no such procedure would have been sustained. New Jersey seems to be the
only other State providing for such accounts in its statutes.
DISCOVERY
STATUTORY PROVIsIONs ON EXAMINATION OF PARTIES -

OF.ICERS, AGENTS, AND EMPLOYEE

-

CORPORATE

Lewis v. Atlanta-Charlotte Airline

Railway Co., 159 S.E.2d 243 (S.C. 1968). - Plaintiff's intestate was allegedly killed when struck by defendant's train. In a wrongful death and
survivor action, plaintiff, prior to trial, requested a court order requiring the
defendant to submit to an examination by and through its engineer. It was
stated that the engineer was the sole person having knowledge of the pertinent facts of the accident. A State circuit court issued the order and defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina, in affirming the order, stood unimpressed by defendant's citations to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the statutes of other States which limit the pretrial examination of corporate parties to managing officers and authorized agents. The court reasoned that since the South Carolina statute did not provide specifically for
such examination and since the reason for the limiting rule in the other
jurisdictions was due to fear that a corporation would be bound by the
testimony of a low ranking employee adverse to its interests, it should give
greater weight to the fact that essential and pertinent information remained
peculiarly within the knowledge of defendant's engineer. Having determined that it could, until such time as it might arise, defer the question as
to the binding effect of the engineer's testimony, the court could find no
compelling reason for disturbing the long followed State practice of requiring the examination of any employee who possessed the information sought.
ELECTIONS
LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT -

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE -

Avery

v. Midland County, 88 S. Ct. 1114 (1968).The one man, one vote principle of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), applies to local governing
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units. So held the United States Supreme Court in vacating and remanding
a Texas Supreme Court decision which had held that selection of the Midland County Commissioners Court from districts of substantially unequal
size did not necessarily violate the 14th amendment. By so ruling, the Court
extended the principle to an estimated 80,000 units of local government
across the nation.
The lengthy and vigorous dissents argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction, that the administrative feasibility of the application of Reynolds to
State legislative apportionment had not been demonstrated, and most importantly, that problems of this nature will be adequately solved only when
units of local government are properly defined, with due attention being
given to their specialized and diverse natures.
EMINENT DOMAIN
LAYING UNDERGROUND PIPES AND SEWERS - Ziegler
v. Ohio Water Service Co., 14 Ohio App. 2d 1, 235 N.E.2d 243 (1968). Appellee obtained an injunction ordering the appellant to cease entering
upon appellee's land. Appellant had been installing a water line on a portion of the land subject to a highway easement. An Ohio Court of Appeals,
in affirming the order, held that the construction of a water main in a highway easement outside a municipality for the purposes of supplying water for
domestic uses and fire protection constituted an additional burden upon the
fee of the abutting owner.
The decision followed the precedent set down by the Ohio Supreme
Court in Hofius v. Carnegie-IllinoisSteel Corp., 146 Ohio St. 574, 67 NE.
2d 429 (1946), which held that the fee to a county highway is in the abutting landowner and that the public has only the right to improvement of,
and uninterrupted travel over, such highway until a specific easement has
been acquired by negotiation or eminent domain.
COMPENSATION -

INFANTS
CUSTODY AND PROTECTION -

EVIDENCE -

In re Urbasek, 232 N.E.2d 716

(Ill. 1967). - Upon the preponderance of the evidence, pursuant to the
Illinois Juvenile Court Act, Robert Urbasek, a minor, was adjudged to be a
juvenile delinquent for murdering his playmate. The Illinois Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the judgment, stating that the recent United States
Supreme Court decision of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), required that
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt a charge of delinquency
where the acts constituting the alleged delinquent conduct would amount
to a crime if charged against an adult.
By so holding, the court adopted what was formerly the minority view
with respect to quantum of evidence in delinquency proceedings. While
this decision voided the provisions of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act which
incorporated the preponderance standard, nevertheless it modified that statutory scheme in such a way that the Act could well become a model among
the States for protecting the rights of juvenile court defendants.
INTERNAL REVENUE

CRIMINAL PROSECUTION - LIMITATION OF PROSECUTIONS - United
States v. Habig, 389 U.S. 810 (1968). - The defendants were indicted for
crimes related to allegedly false income tax returns. A federal district
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court dismissed two of the counts of the indictment on the ground that the
6-year statute of limitations in the Internal Revenue Code barred prosecution. The defendants had been granted an extension beyond the filing deadline for the return in question. The district court, in calculating the 6-year
limitation, used the deadline date as the start of the period and not the extended date on which the return was filed. The United States Supreme
Court reversed the district court and held that Congress did not intend that
the limitation period should begin to run before the defendant committed
the acts upon which the crimes were based. Under the Code, the statute of
limitations begins to run on the deadline date for administrative convenience and it does not apply when an extension of time is granted.
The Supreme Court, in making this statutory interpretation, continues
the overall tax policy of construing the Code against any taxpayer who fraudulently tries to evade the payment of income tax.
INcoME TAXES ON CAPITAL INCREASE - TRANSACTIONS IN MINERALS
AND INERAL INTERESTS - Coleman v.United States, 388 F.2d 377 (Ct.

Cl. 1967). - In 1935, taxpayer corporation's predecessor in interest agreed
with Shamrock Gas and Oil Corp. to a long-term purchase sales contract by
which Shamrock would sell to it a certain amount of residue gas daily in
exchange for the carbon minerals produced by the predecessor in its burning of said gas. Subsidiary agreements granted to the predecessor purchase
priority rights in Shamrock's natural gas and a qualified right to resell the
residue gas. In 1946, after the taxpayer had succeeded to all other rights
under the 1935 agreements, its right to resell the residue gas was made absolute as to three-fourths of the amount it acquired from Shamrock. In 1952
the taxpayer ceased all operations and the parties entered into a new contract which revoked all previous agreements. As consideration for the release from its obligation to sell, Shamrock agreed to pay the taxpayer 6
cents per 1000 cubic feet on that fraction of its residue gas over which the
taxpayer had had an absolute right of resale. These payments amounted to
$207,948 in 1953, and plaintiff, as trustee of the then dissolved taxpayer
corporation, filed a petition for a refund on income taxes paid thereon.
In denying recovery and dismissing the petition, the United States Court
of Claims found that, under the controversial doctrine of essentiality, the
taxpayer had no "economic interest" in Shamrock's processing of gas and
was thus not entitled to a refund by way of a deduction for percentage depletion. Furthermore, it was determined that the taxpayer's contractual rights
under the 1935 agreements did not constitute a "capital asset" such that a
"sale or exchange" thereof would confer upon plaintiff a recovery by treating payments under the 1952 contract as a long-term capital gain. A strong
dissent rebuked the majority for exercising the ploy of "essentiality" to defeat congressional purpose and ignoring the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the term "economic interest."
LABOR RELATONS
TEACHERS' STRIKES - Board of Education v. Ohio Education Association, 13 Ohio Misc. 308, 235 N.E.2d 538 (C.P. Belmont
County 1967). - Plaintiff sought to continue a temporary injunction restraining defendant from carrying on activities in aid of a local teachers'
strike. Defendant contended that a local board of education may not obtain an injunction against the activities of a statewide teachers' association
INJUNCTIONS -
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and that such an injunction would be violative of defendant's rights of freedom of speech and assemblage.
In ordering the injunction to be continued, an Ohio Common Pleas
Court said that OHIO REV. CODE §5 4117.01-.05 prohibits strikes by public
employees and that it necessarily follows that any organization representing
teachers does not have the right to aid and encourage such a strike. The
court held that an injunction restraining such illegal activities is a reasonable
restriction and not violative of any constitutional guarantees.
MENTAL HEALTH

State v. Marion County
Criminal Court, Division One, 234 N.E.2d 636 (Ind. 1968). - Plaintiff
sought to compel the Marion County Criminal Court to expunge from the
record an order for plaintiff to answer all questions put to him by two court
appointed physicians in a hearing to determine whether or not he was a
sexual psychopath. Plaintiff contended that although the defendant court
was acting pursuant to a statute, the statute was unconstitutional because it
violated his privilege against self-incrimination.
The Indiana Supreme Court, in a split decision, held that the defendant
court had properly instructed plaintiff to answer all questions. After reviewing the decisions in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the court concluded that since no criminal
liability can be attached to the status of a sexually dangerous person, the
evil at which the privilege against self-incrimination is aimed is not present
when the compelled examination shows no more than the existence or nonexistence of this status.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS -

NEGLIGENCE
CONDITION AND USE OF BUILDINGS -

TO BUSINESS INVTEE -

PRECAUTIONS AGAINST INJURY

Pribble v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 437 P.2d 745 (Ore.

1968). - Plaintiff was injured when water on defendant's supermarket
floor caused her to slip and fall. When testimony disclosed that the water
had accumulated from the shoes and garments of customers entering the
store and that the floor had been mopped several times before plaintiffs
entry, the trial court granted defendant's motion for nonsuit.
In reversing, the Oregon Supreme Court held that in view of the increased use of mats and rugs in entrance ways to avoid the consequences of
a wet surface, a jury could reasonably find that a storekeeper could make
his floor safe from the danger of water being tracked in by customers coming in from the rain. The decision overruled former case law to the effect
that a storekeeper could not reasonably make his store safe when customers
constantly bring in water on their shoes and clothing.
QUESTIONS FOR THE JURY -

KNOWLEDGE OF DEFEcr OR DANGER

-

Carranov. Scheidt, 388 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1967). - The plaintiff, a licensee
in the defendant's home, slipped and fell on a throw rug. Evidence tended
to indicate that the defendant had knowledge of the danger created by the
rug. A federal district court granted summary judgment for the defendant
on the ground that the licensee accepted all risks when she entered the
premises.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed upon finding that Indiana
substantive law required an owner or occupier to warn unaware licensees of
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known hidden dangers. Since only a jury is competent to decide the factual
issues concerning the existence of an owner's duty, the breach of that duty,
and the result of the breach, the court held summary judgment was improperly granted. The case follows the majority doctrine that the existence
of the duty to warn and the result of the breach of the duty are factual issues
for the jury.
PAETS
APPLICATIONS AND PROCEEDINGS - IN GENmERA - In re Natta, 338 F.2d
215 (3d Cir. 1968). -Appellee was a senior party in a patent interference
proceeding. In an effort to rebut the attempts by junior parties to establish an earlier patent application date, appellee moved pursuant to FED. R.
Civ. P. 34 for the production of certain information within the exclusive
knowledge and possession of appellant. A federal district court granted the
motion. In appealing, the appellant alleged that the discovery provisions of
rule 34 were not applicable; and even if they were, appellee had not shown
good cause for discovery. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in sustaining the motion, held that rule 34 applies in a patent interference proceeding
where the moving party has shown that without the aid of a court order,
documents in the possession of his adversary, relevant to the issue of priority and patentability, would be inaccessible.
The holding is in accord with other decisions applying federal discovery
rules to patent proceedings.
PROCESS
MODE AND SUFFICIENCY OF SERVICE - Krabill v. Gibbs, 14
Ohio St. 2d 1, 235 N.E.2d 514 (1968). - Pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE §
2703.23, appellant sought residence service on appellee by mailing a summons to the appellee's usual place of abode. The statute requires mail service to be by registered or certified letter, but appellant had sent the process
by ordinary mail. Reversing a decision in favor of the appellee, the Ohio
Supreme Court held that irregularity of the summons will not defeat the
process so long as the statutory objectives of notice and an opportunity to
be heard have been met.
The court noted that the appellee admitted by stipulation the receipt of
the summons at his usual place of residence, thereby supplying proof that
the statutory objectives of process had been fulfilled. The decision affirms
the prevailing trend to validate process when the requirement of substantial
fairness has been met.
SERVICE -

